

Supporting Information

Presidential Daily Diary

Our attention data comes from the “Presidential Daily Diary.” We show an example page from this record in Figure 2. We identify four of the meetings on this page as relevant to foreign policy. The first is a two-minute phone call between President Carter and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. We code this as relevant to foreign policy on the basis of the name “Harold Brown” and the keyword “Secretary of Defense”. The second is a five-minute meeting between Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, which is coded as relevant to foreign policy on the basis of the name “Brzezinski” and the keyword “National Security”. The third is a subsequent meeting with Brzezinski, and the fourth is a meeting involving Carter, Walter Mondale, two Chinese officials, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. We identify this as relevant to foreign policy on the basis of the name “Cyrus Vance”, the keyword “Secretary of State”, and the keyword “China.” The only distinction we make among meetings is whether or not they pertain to foreign policy. We do not, for example, count the phone call with Harold Brown in a different way than we would count an in-person meeting. We also make no distinction on the basis of the time of day. While a phone call in the middle of the night likely signifies something different than a scheduled meeting in the middle of the day, we do not have clear *a priori* reasons to believe that the effectiveness of presidential attention is higher at one time than the other.

The quality of presidential daily diary data varies somewhat over time, partially as a result of missing or incomplete records from the presidential libraries and partially as a result of error introduced through the OCR and automated parsing process. In Figure 3, we plot the total number of minutes of recorded activity in our dataset at the monthly level. This measure is relatively constant over time, with the exception of substantial drops in the middle of the Johnson administration, throughout the Eisenhower administration, and at

the end of the Reagan administration, along with a somewhat substantial spike during the Ford administration. We note that variation in the total recorded duration is mostly related to measurement issues; that is, a lower duration for a given month likely does *not* reflect an overall decrease in presidential activity.

As a second measure, in Figure 4, we crudely approximate the level of OCR error in the data by computing the percentage of words in the OCR results found among the 333,333 most common words of the Google Web Trillion Word Corpus, composed of English language words on public web pages. This measure is imperfect, both because the fact that a word occurs in the corpus does not indicate that it was read correctly and because uncommon proper nouns (e.g., names of certain advisors such as Ford Press Secretary Jerald terHorst or Roosevelt Secretary of State Edward Stettinius) are not included in the corpus. Thus, the measure is approximate, and is more comparable within administrations than across them, given that the relative frequency of uncommon last names in the diaries varies dramatically. We further note that this measure does not reflect cases in which OCR simply fails to recognize the existence of text. All in all, however, this measure indicates fairly stable performances over time, with the exception of brief periods in the 1960s and 1980s where performance is quite poor.

THE WHITE HOUSE		THE DAILY DIARY OF PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER	
LOCATION		DATE (Mo., Day, Yr.)	
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON, D.C.		FEBRUARY 8, 1977	
		TIME	DAY
		6:30 a.m. TUESDAY	
TIME		PHONE	ACTIVITY
From	To	R = Rec'd P = Placed	
6:30		R	The President received a wake up call from the White House signal board operator.
6:58			The President went to the Oval Office.
7:18	7:20	P	The President talked with Secretary of Defense Harold Brown.
7:30	7:35		The President met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski.
7:45	7:48		The President met with his Assistant for Congressional Liaison, Frank Moore.
7:48	7:51		The President met with Mr. Brzezinski.
8:00			The President went to the Cabinet Room.
8:00	9:10		The President hosted a breakfast meeting for Democratic Congressional leaders. For a list of attendees, see APPENDIX "A." Members of the press, in/out
9:03		R	The President was telephoned by Secretary of the Interior Cecil D. Andrus. The President's Personal Secretary, Susan Clough took the call.
9:10			The President returned to the Oval Office. He was accompanied by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minnesota).
9:10	9:22		The President met with Senator Humphrey.
9:22	9:40		The President met with: Representative Frank Horton (D-New York) Mr. Moore
10:00		R	The President was telephoned by Senator John Sparkman (D-Louisiana). The call was not completed.
10:03	11:30		The President met with: Walter F. Mondale, Vice President Huang Chen, Chief of the Liaison Office of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Washington, D.C. Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington, D.C. Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State

continued

Figure 2: *Example Page from the President's Daily Diary* The image displays the first page of Carter's daily diary for February 8, 1977. We have highlighted the meetings identified by our method as relevant to foreign policy.




Figure 3: *Total Recorded Activity in Daily Diaries*




Figure 4: *Approximate Measure of OCR Quality*




Figure 5: *Presidential Attention to Foreign Policy.* This figure shows the president’s monthly hours spent on foreign policy compared to the term average number of hours spent on foreign policy, according to our parsing of the “president’s Daily Diary”. According to our estimates (as a reference here), the president spends on average around 8 fewer hours per month on foreign policy during the last six months of the presidential campaign season.

Events dataset descriptive statistics

Newspaper	Event count	Event count (in US bloc)
<i>Globe and Mail</i>	22221	8951
<i>Straits-Times</i>	42061	8297
<i>Canberra Times</i>	15248	6345
<i>New York Times</i>	19391	5670
<i>Jewish Telegraph Agency</i>	15155	5520
<i>Jerusalem Post</i>	9815	2753
<i>Los Angeles Times</i>	14093	2638
<i>Christian Science Monitor</i>	4730	1678
<i>Wall Street Journal</i>	5835	1652
<i>Times of India</i>	7671	1118

Table 5: *Counts of events by source* This table displays the number of international events drawn from each of the news sources included in our analysis and the number of these events that include two countries within the US bloc.

Country	Event Count (in US bloc)	Event Count (not in US bloc)	Distance Weighted Mean (not in US bloc)	Distance Weighted Mean (in US bloc)	Terms Aligned
United Kingdom	17726	12401	0.50	0.39	13
Canada	9580	5412	0.96	0.64	13
France	8956	5581	0.79	0.74	13
Israel	8569	20386	0.64	0.72	13
Australia	7742	5540	1.21	0.66	11
Japan	4057	5051	1.32	1.15	10
New Zealand	2512	1054	1.38	0.78	11
Italy	2388	1555	0.95	0.78	11
Netherlands	2084	1272	0.66	0.64	13
Malaysia	1985	7817	2.48	1.46	3
Belgium	1778	560	0.74	0.63	13
Greece	1535	1750	1.73	0.81	10
Ireland	1486	856	1.78	1.02	8
Turkey	1298	2004	1.82	0.49	7
Spain	1076	1340	1.64	1.10	8
Thailand	1006	4944	2.52	1.16	7
Philippines	992	1945	2.34	1.30	7
Denmark	849	340	0.99	0.81	13
Norway	817	269	1.18	0.85	13
Argentina	774	1499	2.60	0.81	7
Austria	712	1146	1.51	1.02	8
Brazil	673	724	2.60	0.82	8
Sweden	639	621	1.57	0.81	10
Pakistan	559	3300	2.56	1.36	5
Mexico	505	1319	2.83	1.24	7
Portugal	459	602	1.17	0.83	11
Chile	381	563	2.29	1.11	8
Cyprus	319	1195	2.69	1.46	2
Lebanon	316	5861	2.83	1.37	4
Iraq	279	5809	3.67	1.42	3
Jordan	279	4515	2.74	1.48	1
Egypt	244	12912	2.70	1.18	1
Finland	241	355	1.71	1.07	8
Cuba	200	1776	3.95	0.93	4
Guatemala	177	276	2.63	1.12	9
Peru	157	683	2.80	0.69	6
Congo	156	232	2.65	1.41	2
Tunisia	150	620	2.65	1.34	2
El Salvador	146	499	2.64	1.00	9
Honduras	143	365	2.56	0.86	9
Panama	135	376	2.58	0.84	7
Colombia	113	488	2.70	0.87	8
Jamaica	103	327	2.52	1.51	3
Nicaragua	101	729	3.52	0.43	8
Costa Rica	97	275	2.40	0.77	8
Myanmar	93	1189	2.43	1.74	2
Fiji	92	242	2.52	1.57	3
Ecuador	73	217	2.83	0.99	7
Libya	39	1988	3.50	1.70	2
Ethiopia	33	868	3.13	1.37	4

Table 6: *Counts of events involving countries within the US bloc.* Means are weighted by number of events. “in US bloc” limits event counts and weighted means to interactions involving two countries both aligned with the United States and “not in US bloc” limits event counts and weighted means to interactions involving at least one country not aligned with the United States at the time of the event.

Construction of the Dependent Variable

Our dependent variable is an aggregation of Goldstein scale scores for dyadic events. Goldstein (1992) originally constructed the scale for 61 WEIS event types through a poll of international relations experts, who were asked to rate events on a -10 (most conflictual) to +10 (most cooperative) scale. The results produced category-level codings running from -10 (for military attack) to +8.3 (for extending military assistance). The CAMEO framework includes substantially more categories than WEIS, consequently it spans the full -10 to +10 theoretical range of the Goldstein scale. To assist readers in interpreting the scale, Table 7 displays selected events from our data corresponding to various points on the scale.

Ultimately, we take these dyadic codings and aggregate them by taking a simple mean for each group of states (US bloc, non-US bloc, cross-bloc, direct American interactions) within each month. Consequently, we have a monthly-level measure of the overall level of cooperativeness or conflictualness within each group.




Figure 6: *Top 50 countries aligned with US, by term.* Our alignment measure is drawn from ideal point estimates using United Nations voting data by Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten (2013). The cutoff for aligned vs. not aligned is the median, term-averaged ideal point distance between the United States and interacting countries in the events data. We average ideal point distances over four-year terms to rule out possible country cutoff jumping effects around elections. These are the top (by years aligned) 50 countries aligned with the United States.




Figure 7: *Proportion of countries in US bloc, by term (displayed at election year).* The decline in this proportion in the 1960s is driven by a larger number of independent states in that period.




Figure 8: *Number of events in US bloc, by month*




Figure 9: *Conflict level in US bloc, by month*

Scale Value	Category	Example Event
-10.0	Fight with small arms and light weapons	“Turkish and Greek border patrols on the Evros River exchanged shots today.” - <i>The Straits Times</i> , August 1956
-8.0	Impose embargo, boycott, or sanctions	“Malaya announced today that it would ban the import of all South African goods from August 1.” - <i>The Times of India</i> , July 1960
-7.2	Mobilize or increase armed forces	“The Congo Government sent more troops to Kasai Province today in an apparent build-up for an invasion of Katanga” - <i>The New York Times</i> , August 1960
-5.0	Impose administrative sanctions	“Japan, who will host the third Asian track and field meet here from May 31-June 3, will bar Israel from taking part.” - <i>The Straits Times</i> , February 1979
-2.0	Complain officially	“Sweden has protested to Turkey over the arrest of Captain Oscar Lorentzon of the Swedish ship Naboland which was in collision with a Turkish submarine in the Dardanelles last week.” - <i>The Straits Times</i> , April 1953
2.8	Host a visit	“French President Vincent Auriol of the Fourth Republic is paying a state visit to London on the completion of 50 years of cordial relations between Great Britain and France.” - <i>The Los Angeles Times</i> , March 1950
5.2	Express intent to cooperate economically	“Japan will discuss possible voluntary restraint on car exports to Canada.” - <i>The New York Times</i> , May 1981
7.0	Apologize	“The British Embassy apologised to the Philippine Government today because a Royal Air Force jetbomber intruded in Philippine air space and said the incident resulted from administrative error.” - <i>The Straits Times</i> , October 1971
7.4	Cooperate militarily	“Canada is joining the United States and Australia in development of a new system of communications, using satellites, for use by land forces on the battlefield.” - <i>The Globe and Mail</i> , April 1967
10.0	Retreat or surrender militarily	“Britain was today withdrawing its three frigates from the disputed fishing waters off Iceland but the Government here will be keeping an anxious eye on the trawlers they leave behind.” - <i>The Globe and Mail</i> , October 1973

Table 7: Example events within the US bloc for representative points on the Goldstein scale.

Additional Tests

	Model 5	Model 6
Proximate Reelection	-10.41 (3.93) <i><0.01</i>	-9.75 (3.24) <i><0.01</i>
Proximate Not Reelection	-0.90 (4.21) <i>0.83</i>	-5.12 (3.12) <i>0.10</i>
Proximate Midterm	0.41 (2.84) <i>0.89</i>	3.17 (2.55) <i>0.21</i>
Month Effects	Y	Y
Presidential Term Effects	Y	N
Biennial Effects	N	Y
n	633	633

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. All models fit via OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 8: *Relationship Between Elections and Presidential Time Spent on Foreign Policy (Hours)*. This table shows the declines in presidential attention to foreign policy June through November during election years, separating those where the president is running for reelection from those where he is not. These results should be interpreted with caution because we have only four total elections in which the president did not seek reelection and in two of these cases (1952 and 1968) this decision was explicitly linked to international conditions. Furthermore, we are missing presidential diary data for some years of the Johnson administration and have very little diary information from Reagan's last year in office.

	Attention to foreign policy / Term average attention (scaled)
Proximate	-0.25 (0.09) <i>< 0.01</i>
Year (scaled)	0.33 (0.56) <i>0.56</i>
Proximate election:Year	-0.02 (0.09) <i>0.86</i>
n	633

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. All models fit via OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, and term fixed effects.

Table 9: *Election-Attention Estimate with Linear Time Trend Interaction.* This model shows that attention to foreign policy during election periods does not significantly increase or decrease over time. We divide monthly attention by a president’s term average attention so that all coefficients are interpretable as a within term attention change effect. The dependent variable and time (year) variables are scaled by their standard deviation and centered at zero.

	Time Spent on Foreign Policy (hours per month)	
Proximate Election	-8.12 (3.44) <i>0.02</i>	-10.55 (3.44) <i><0.01</i>
Month Effects	Y	Y
Presidential Term Effects	Y	N
Biennial Effects	N	Y
n	479	479

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. All models fit via OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 10: *Relationship Between Elections and Presidential Time Spent on Foreign Policy (Hours), Conflict Observation Period.* We replicate here our election-distraction estimates for the 1946 through 1990 conflict data observation overlap period.

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Proximate Reelection	-0.30 (0.12) <i>0.02</i>	-0.28 (0.13) <i>0.03</i>	-0.31 (0.13) <i>0.03</i>
Proximate Not Reelection	-0.05 (0.18) <i>0.79</i>	-0.18 (0.18) <i>0.32</i>	-0.08 (0.16) <i>0.61</i>
Proximate Midterm	0.09 (0.14) <i>0.52</i>	0.05 (0.11) <i>0.64</i>	-0.003 (0.11) <i>0.98</i>
Month Effects	Y	Y	Y
Quadrennial Effects	N	Y	N
Biennial Effects	N	N	Y
n	576	576	576

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. All models fit via OLS using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 11: *Relationship Between Elections and Conflict Within American Bloc (Average Goldstein Scale)*. The models in this table separate elections where the incumbent president was running for reelection from those where he was not. Like the results in Table 8, these estimates should be treated with caution because we have only four total elections in which the president did not seek reelection and in two of these cases (1952 and 1968) this decision was explicitly linked to international conditions. The comparison of reelection years vs. non-reelection years is underpowered, but these models, at the very least, suggest that the overall estimates are not driven by the years in which the president was not running for reelection. Further, there is suggestive evidence here that there is not a conflict effect in non-reelection years (or at least that this conflict effect is attenuated).




Figure 10: *US Bloc Cutoff Insensitivity.* These figures show that our distraction-conflict estimates are insensitive to the choice of ideal point distance cutoff for the US bloc. The first figure displays biennial fixed effects and the second figure displays alternate quadrennial fixed effects. As in the main paper, these models were also estimated with month fixed effects and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. The blue line is the estimate at the chosen cutoff: the median ideal point distance between interacting countries in the events dataset. The x-axis is the smallest proportion of events in the dataset between two countries *both* below the relevant cutoff in any year (1946 to 1993) and the y-axis is the election period conflict level estimate for these events.

Diplomatic Shift (Dyad)	Estimated Magnitude	Pre-Event Average (Years Used)	Post-Event Average (Years Used)
Camp David Accords (Egypt and Israel)	3.23	-0.55 (1948-1978)	2.68 (1979-1993)
US Opening to China (US and China)	2.23	0.54 (1950-1971)	2.23 (1972-1988)
Release of Nelson Mandela (US and South Africa)	1.35	0.13 (1977-1989)	1.49 (1990-1993)
Chinese reforms (China and Japan)	0.59	2.06 (1949-1976)	2.65 (1977-1993)
Rise of Deng Xiaoping (China and Japan)	0.16	2.91 (1972-1976)	3.08 (1977-1984)
Election of De Gaulle (US and France)	-0.25	2.11 (1948-1958)	1.86 (1959-1969)
Election of De Gaulle (UK and France)	-0.35	2.25 (1948-1958)	1.89 (1959-1969)
End of Détente (US and USSR)	-0.86	1.65 (1969-1979)	0.79 (1980-1984)
Cuban Revolution (US and Cuba)	-1.08	1.57 (1946-1959)	0.48 (1960-1993)
Islamic Revolution (US and Iran)	-1.71	2.30 (1946-1978)	0.59 (1979-1993)
Islamic Revolution (Iran and Iraq)	-3.40	-0.56 (1946-1978)	-3.96 (1979-1993)

Table 12: *Size of Major Diplomatic Shifts on Average Goldstein Scale of Interactions within Dyads.* To assist readers in interpreting the magnitude of the election effects reported in the paper, we provide a measure here of the shift in the average Goldstein scale of various dyads in response to major diplomatic events. We remind readers that the estimated effect of elections on U.S. bloc conflict is roughly -0.25 to -0.30, and that more negative values indicate more conflictual interactions. Thus, the effect of elections most closely resembles the magnitude of the change in US-French relations associated with the presidency of Charles De Gaulle. We note, however, that the shifts in this table reflect a variety of factors and are not intended to represent causal effects.

	Conflict / Term Average Conflict (scaled)
Proximate Election	-0.23 (0.12) <i>0.06</i>
Year (scaled)	-0.04 (0.04) <i>0.32</i>
Proximate Election:Year (scaled)	0.10 (0.12) <i>0.37</i>
n	576

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. Model fit via OLS along with an intercept and month fixed effects (now shown) using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 13: *Election-Conflict Estimate with Linear Time Trend Interaction.* This model shows that increased conflict during election periods does not significantly increase or decrease over time. We divide monthly conflict by a president’s term average conflict so that all coefficients are interpretable as a within term conflict change effect. The dependent variable and time (year) variables are scaled by their standard deviation and centered at zero.

	Conflict
Proximate Election	−0.23 (0.12) <i>0.06</i>
Presidential Approval (scaled)	0.01 (0.04) <i>0.78</i>
Proximate Election:Presidential Approval (scaled)	−0.01 (0.11) <i>0.92</i>
n	499

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. Model fit via OLS along with an intercept and month fixed effects (now shown) using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 14: *Relationship Between Presidential Approval during Presidential Campaign Season and Level of Conflict Within US Bloc.* This table shows that the increased level of conflict within the US bloc is not greater when the president’s approval rating is lower. This suggests that the election-conflict result is not driven by the probability that the president will lose office. We do not have presidential approval for seventy-seven months and we drop these months, however, linear interpolation to impute missing data between surveys does not alter the results.

	Conflict	Conflict _t - Conflict _{t-1}
Presidential Attention (scaled)	-0.03 (0.06) <i>0.54</i>	
Attention _t - Attention _{t-1} (scaled)		-0.06 (0.05) <i>0.25</i>
n	479	466

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. Model fit via OLS along with an intercept, month, and presidential term fixed effects (not shown) using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 15: *Relationships Between Time Spent on Foreign Policy and Level of Conflict in US Bloc.* This table shows that monthly time spent on foreign policy by the president is not significantly associated with conflict levels in the US bloc. As we note in the text, there is likely substantial reverse causality between attention and conflict as well as a variety of omitted variables that influence each of these, so we caution against drawing causal conclusions from this result. We also are missing attention data for fifty-nine months of the conflict-attention data overlap (mostly from the Kennedy administration). Imputing missing data (for administrations other than Kennedy) does not meaningfully alter the results.

	Time Spent on Foreign Policy (hours per month)	
Proximate election	-7.80 (3.17) <i>0.02</i>	-7.87 (3.97) <i>0.06</i>
Recession <i>source: BLS</i>	-0.16 (2.35) <i>0.95</i>	
Natural disasters (scaled) <i>source: FEMA</i>		-1.53 (1.22) <i>0.22</i>
n	633	395

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. All models fit via OLS with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, along with month and presidential term fixed effects (not shown).

Table 16: *Other potential predictors of presidential attention to foreign policy.* This table shows that economic recessions (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)) and natural disasters (measured through federal disaster declarations, *starting in 1953*) do not significantly alter presidential time spent on foreign policy. We might not expect the president to substitute time spent on the economy for foreign policy time because the marginal benefit of time spent on the economy is not likely substantially larger during a recession than at other times and the president always has a substantial interest in maximizing economic performance. We would, however, expect the president to spend less time on foreign policy following natural disasters (and the estimate here is negative), however, the effect is perhaps not sufficiently large to be statistically significant in this shorter timeframe. FEMA disaster declarations are counts of declarations by month, scaled by their standard deviation, and centered at zero.

	Conflict among countries US bloc	
Proximate election	-0.28 (0.10) <i>0.01</i>	-0.16 (0.10) <i>0.10</i>
Recession (US) <i>source: BLS</i>	-0.21 (0.09) <i>0.02</i>	
Natural disasters (US) (scaled) <i>source: FEMA</i>		-0.07 (0.04) <i>0.06</i>
n	576	492

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. Model fit via OLS along with an intercept, month, and quadrennial fixed effects (not shown) using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.

Table 17: *Relationships between potential presidential distractions and conflict in the US bloc.* This figure shows that economic recessions are significantly associated (from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)) and natural disasters (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and predecessors', disaster declarations) are weakly and insignificantly associated with increased conflict in the US bloc. US and worldwide recessions may directly cause conflict in the US bloc, rather than through a presidential distraction effect, especially given that we observe no decline in presidential attention to foreign policy during recessions. In Table 16, we observed a statistically insignificant decline in presidential attention to foreign policy surrounding FEMA disaster declarations, and here we find a negative, but also statistically insignificant, increase in conflict levels within the American bloc. These results are consistent with our theory, but not nearly as strong as those for elections. FEMA disaster declarations are counts of declarations by month, scaled by the standard deviation of the variable, and centered at zero.

Country	Added Events (allied to aligned)	Country	Distance Weighted Mean (in US bloc, allied or aligned)
Israel	9288	United Kingdom	0.41
United Kingdom	6618	South Africa	0.45
France	2578	Turkey	0.50
Malaysia	2019	Luxembourg	0.53
Australia	1842	New Zealand	0.62
Canada	1839	Belgium	0.64
Ireland	1495	Netherlands	0.66
Spain	1095	Australia	0.68
Thailand	1012	Peru	0.70
Austria	745	Canada	0.71
Netherlands	730	Israel	0.71
Turkey	708	France	0.75
Philippines	685	Malta	0.79
Sweden	659	Argentina	0.82
Greece	587	Sweden	0.83
Italy	586	Italy	0.83
Japan	574	Brazil	0.83
Pakistan	543	Denmark	0.83
New Zealand	520	Taiwan	0.85
Belgium	519	Norway	0.86
Iran	503	Portugal	0.91
South Africa	457	Greece	0.93
Argentina	414	Uruguay	1.00
Denmark	357	Ireland	1.02
Norway	334	Austria	1.02
Cyprus	319	Finland	1.08
Lebanon	316	Congo, Democratic Republic of	1.09
Iraq	279	Spain	1.15
Jordan	279	Thailand	1.17
Brazil	274	Chile	1.17
Finland	248	Egypt	1.18
Egypt	244	Japan	1.19
Mexico	236	Mexico	1.24
Laos	226	Philippines	1.30
Congo	157	Germany	1.32
Portugal	150	Tunisia	1.34
Tunisia	150	Pakistan	1.36
Germany	144	Lebanon	1.37
Chile	117	Iran	1.37
Luxembourg	115	Liberia	1.38
Malta	110	Congo	1.41
Fiji	94	Iraq	1.42
Myanmar	93	Cyprus	1.46
Jamaica	84	Malaysia	1.46
Uruguay	82	Jordan	1.48
Taiwan	75	Jamaica	1.51
Liberia	63	Laos	1.52
Peru	62	Fiji	1.57
Congo, Democratic Republic of	61	Sri Lanka	1.70
Sri Lanka	60	Myanmar	1.74

Table 18: *Events Added Between Alliance Only and Alliance Plus Aligned US Bloc, by Country.* This table shows the number of in-bloc events and alignments of countries added to the US bloc from the allied only to the allied plus alignment subset of our events data (limited to the top fifty countries with the most added events). The addition of these interactions is the most important distinction between the alignment events and allied events because allies who are not aligned with the United States make up a relatively small portion of the covered events. The in-bloc alignment numbers differ slightly from Table 6 because of the inclusion of allies throughout the observation period and added events include those from months in which the United States had not yet entered formal alliances.

	Alliances Only			Alliances Plus Aligned		
Proximate Election	-0.10 (0.12) <i>0.38</i>	-0.16 (0.14) <i>0.25</i>	-0.12 (0.12) <i>0.31</i>	-0.23 (0.10) <i>0.02</i>	-0.30 (0.10) <i>0.005</i>	-0.25 (0.09) <i>0.01</i>
Month Effects	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Quadrennial Effects	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
Biennial Effects	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
n	566	566	566	576	576	576

Standard errors in parentheses; p-values in *italics*. Model fit via OLS along with an intercept, month, and time fixed effects (not shown) using heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors, and weighted by the square root of the number of interactions in each month.

Table 19: *Relationship Between Elections and Conflict Within American Bloc (Average Goldstein Scale), Alliances and Alliances Plus Aligned.* This table shows election-conflict estimates among countries with a defense pact with the United States (left) and among countries with a defense pact with the United States plus all aligned countries (right). The allied restriction excludes some years of interactions with aligned countries who later enter an alliance with the United States. Table 18 lists added interactions by country in an allied plus aligned measure, and Figures 11 and 12 show convergence from the allied only to allied plus aligned estimate showing that no single country drives the estimates. These models are weighted by the square root of the number of in-bloc interactions in each month because the number of interactions in the allied only subset, unlike the aligned subset, is highly imbalanced across the time period.




Figure 11: *US Bloc, Allied to Aligned (by Number of In-Bloc Events)*. This figure shows convergence in our election-conflict estimates from alliances only to alliances plus aligned countries estimates. We add countries (and all their in-bloc interactions) to the data by the number of events added between the allied and allied plus aligned subsets to show that convergence is smooth (i.e. the effect is not limited to a single country). The left-hand side of Table 18 gives the country order.




Figure 12: *US Bloc, Allied to Aligned (by Alignment Order)*. This figure shows convergence in our election-conflict estimates from alliances only to alliances plus aligned countries estimates. We add countries (and all their in-bloc interactions) to the data by their closeness of alignment to the United States to show that convergence is smooth (i.e. the effect is not limited to a single country). The right-hand side of Table 18 gives the country order.




Figure 13: *US Bloc, Country-by-Country Jackknife.* This figure shows the change in our election-conflict estimate when removing countries one-by-one. The gray bars represent a null distribution, calculated as the 95% range of the change in the estimate when removing an equivalent number of events from the data completely at random (and repeating 1,000 times) and are provided to give a rough estimate of whether or not the effect of removing a country is unusually large. Points above the red line (e.g., France) indicate that removing a country makes the estimated election conflict result smaller, while points below the red line (e.g., the United Kingdom) indicate that removing a country makes the estimated election conflict result larger. Overall, the results suggest that our estimates do not overly rely on the election conflict of any specific country.




Figure 14: *US Bloc, Period-by-Period Jackknife.* This figure shows the change in our election-conflict estimate when removing four year periods one-by-one. The gray bars represent a null distribution, calculated as the 95% range of the change in the estimate when removing an equivalent number of events from the data completely at random (and repeating 1,000 times) and are provided to give a rough estimate of whether or not the effect of removing a four year period is unusually large.